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A very common but untested assumption is that potential children would consent to 
be exposed to the harms of existence in order to experience its benefits (if it were 
possible for us to ask and for them to respond).  And so, would-be parents might 
appeal to the following view: Procreation is all-things-considered permissible, as it is 
morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if one has 
good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed 
reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent.  I argue that this view is in 
error.  My argument appeals to a consent-based version of anti-natalism advanced by 
Seana Valentine Shiffrin.  Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong 
to bring people (and perhaps all sentient beings) into existence.  While, like Shiffrin, I 
stop short of advocating a thoroughgoing anti-natalism, I nevertheless argue that 
procreators cannot appeal to hypothetical consent to justify exposing children to the 
harms of existence.  I end by suggesting a more promising route by which this 
justification might be achieved. 
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Anti-natalism is the view that it is (almost) always wrong to bring people (and perhaps all 
sentient beings) into existence.  This view is most famously championed by David Benatar 
(1997, 2006).  Benatar’s anti-natalism has stimulated significant debate, and he has defended 
(2012, 2013, and 2015) his controversial arguments against a number of critics.2  In contrast 
to the attention Benatar’s anti-natalism has received in recent years, other routes to an anti-
natal conclusion that have recently been put forward have gone relatively under-explored (for 
example, Belshaw 2012, Harrison & Tanner 2011, Harrison 2012, and Häyry 2004).  I am of 
the view that an older paper that does not explicitly argue against procreation, Seana 
Valentine Shiffrin’s “Wrongful Life, Procreative Responsibility, and the Significance of 
Harm” (1999), ought to command more attention than the sporadic discussions it has thus far 
elicited within the natal debate.  I focus primarily on her views in this article, chiefly because 
she offers what can be read as a consent-based argument for anti-natalism. 
 
Though Shiffrin appears unwilling to conclude that procreation is always wrong, I 
demonstrate how her account of permissible harm offers a route to anti-natalism that is 
arguably no less persuasive than the arguments defended by Benatar.  The key feature of the 
account of permissible harm Shiffrin advances is that we may only rightfully impose a 
(serious) harm upon a nonconsenting individual in order to remove her from harm, or to 
prevent greater harm from befalling her.  Procreation, Shiffrin acknowledges, appears to fall 
outside the scope of this account of permissible harm.3  
                                                 
2 The list of critics is long, and growing, and includes Bayne (2010), Boonin (2012), Bradley (2010), Brill 
(2012), Brown (2011), DeGrazia (2010, 2012, & 2015), Harman (2009a), Kaposy (2009), McGregor & 
Sulliven-Bissitt (2012), Metz (2011), Packer (2011), Smilansky (2008, 2012), Trisel (2012), and Weinberg 
(2012, 2016).  I will not have space to address their criticisms here. 
3 Shiffrin nevertheless attempts to defend procreation as “a special case” of harming (1999:139), perhaps 
because she fears any perceived anti-natal consequences will result in a reductio ad absurdum objection to her 
overall argument for a wider range of liability in wrongful life suits.  But I do not believe that she does enough 
to save procreation from the anti-natal implications of her account of permissible harm.  The arguments I 
present in the main text will go some way to showing why I think this is the case. 
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I offer a novel Shiffrin-esque route to anti-natalism, and defend it from a powerful and 
original objection.4  This objection asserts that procreation is all-things-considered 
permissible, as it is morally acceptable for one to knowingly harm an unconsenting patient if 
one has good reasons for assuming her hypothetical consent—and procreators can indeed 
reasonably rely on some notion of hypothetical consent on the part of the ones created.  The 
intuition behind the objection is that children would consent—if it were possible for us to ask 
and for them to respond—to the harms of procreation in order to receive its benefits.5  
Despite its prima facie appeal, I show how the hypothetical consent objection in fact fails, 
and why parents need stronger reasons to justify procreation. 
 
I do not look at Benatar’s arguments for anti-natalism; the Shiffrin-esque route to anti-
natalism I outline here can be seen as an alternative, consent-based route to anti-natalism.  
Benatar (2006:49-54) has already compared his (asymmetry) argument to Shiffrin’s, and at 
length, so I do not add to his analysis.  It is worth noting, though, that in appealing to benefits 
to children, I adopt a significantly different strategy to that of Benatar’s, whose treatment of 
procreation makes it look like an activity that could only truly benefit parents—a strategy that 
distinguishes the present paper from other (prominent) discussions of anti-natalism.6  As I 
outline it, the hypothetical consent objection takes the view that procreation can be good for 
the sake of a child.  Furthermore, though Shiffrin states that procreation usually results in 
                                                 
4 David DeGrazia (2012) has independently advanced a “Shiffrin-like” anti-natal argument (2012:150-3); 
however, he rejects her argument, while I support it.  Among other things, DeGrazia argues that the issue of 
procreative harm ought to be weighed against other moral considerations, not the least of which is respecting the 
procreative autonomy of parents.  I will not have space to consider this other-regarding argument in defence of 
procreation, but I will note here that the objection I will be raising to Shiffrin’s “anti-natalism” focuses only on 
(expected) benefits to children, and not on benefits to their parents.  David Benatar, too, has also noted that 
Shiffrin’s argument can be used to defend an anti-natal position (2006:49-54).  However, he favours his 
argument over hers. 
5 Note, however, that Benatar (2007) believes contractors in the Rawlsian “original position” would arrive at an 
anti-natal conclusion. 
6 In attempting to defend procreation via an appeal to benefits to children, my (hypothetical consent) objection 
to anti-natalism also differs from DeGrazia’s (2012), which appeals to benefits to parents. 
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children encountering the “burden-riddled mixed benefit” (1999:140; my emphasis) of 
existence, she offers no further defence of this natal-friendly concession that explicitly 
appeals to the attempt to bestow this benefit to potential children.  Part of my job here will 
thus be to assist Shiffrin in working through a possible, though ultimately unsuccessful, 
method of avoiding the anti-natal implications of her argument.  
  
I start by briefly explaining Shiffrin’s argument, and by illustrating how it can be employed 
to construct and defend a principle of permissible harm that supports anti-natalism.  The key 
feature of this principle is that it is impermissible for one to impose serious, protracted, and 
inescapable (without great cost) harm upon an unconsenting individual purely for the sake of 
granting that individual benefits.  I then test this principle against the aforementioned 
hypothetical consent objection.  On behalf of the Shiffrin-esque anti-natalist, I in turn 
advance two replies to this view.  I conclude by suggesting a promising way to challenge the 
Shiffrin-esque rationale for anti-natalism, and anti-natalism in general. 
 
2. The consent-based argument for anti-natalism7  
A few brief notes on harm will be useful.  Firstly, Shiffrin assumes (as do I, for the sake of 
argument) that being created can both harm and benefit a person.8  Secondly, it is important 
to keep in mind that Shiffrin’s argument relies heavily on the intuition that there is a morally 
relevant difference between choosing to expose oneself to harm (or the risk of harm), and 
making such decisions on behalf of third parties.9  And thirdly, Shiffrin favours a 
                                                 
7 This discussion of Shiffrin’s “anti-natalism”, up until the principle of permissible harm on pp. 8-9, partially 
borrows from Singh (2012b). 
8 For a fairly recent and influential defence of this view, as well as a proposed solution to the non-identity 
problem (which I do not aim to address here), see Harman (2004). 
9 In Shiffrin’s own words: “Harm is objectively bad in such a way that it is morally problematic to inflict 
(unsolicited) a significant level of it on another for the sake of conferring a benefit, although a person may 
reasonably decide to undergo the same level of harm to retain the same level of benefit.” (1999:130) 
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noncomparative account of harm and benefit.10  On comparative accounts, a person is harmed 
if she is made worse off than she would otherwise have been (counterfactual view), or if she 
has been made worse off than she was before (historical view).  Shiffrin’s noncomparative 
account, on the other hand, identifies harms with “certain absolute, noncomparative 
conditions (e.g., a list of evils like broken limbs, disabilities, episodes of pain, significant 
losses, death)” (Shiffrin 1999:123), with benefits similarly differentiated.  On Shiffrin’s 
account, a rescuer who must unavoidably break a person’s arm in the process of saving her 
from drowning both harms and benefits her—an intuitive appraisal, I think—whereas a 
proponent of the counterfactual view might deny that the rescuer harms the rescuee, perhaps 
because the rescuer bestows an overall benefit to the rescuee.11 
 
Another unique feature of Shiffrin’s noncomparative account is the link it draws between 
harm and autonomy.  Harm “brings about a cleavage between a person’s life and her will”, 
which can be “partially or perhaps entirely bridged” when a person willingly chooses to 
suffer harm (Shiffrin 1999:130).  On this view, a feature that all harms share is that “they 
render agents or a significant or close aspect of their lived experience like that of an endurer 
as opposed to that of an active agent” (Shiffrin 1999:123).  I find Shiffrin’s noncomparative 
account of harm and benefit attractive, but lack the space to defend it here.12  In any event, 
my arguments will not require a comprehensive examination of Shiffrin’s noncomparative 
account of harm and benefit; I focus only on a core principle that it entails.   
 
                                                 
10 This account is developed further in Shiffrin (2012).  See also the noncomparative account presented in 
Harman (2009b). 
11 See Feinberg (1986), as well as Shiffrin (1999:120-127). 
12 For an in-depth critique of noncomparative accounts, and the concept of harm in general, see Bradley (2012).  
Rabenberg (2015) also offers a critical summary of accounts of harm. 
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On Shiffrin’s account of harm, procreation appears generally impermissible because it 
imposes a (serious) harm to nonconsenting individuals that is not for a suitably important 
end—which apparently can only be, for Shiffrin, the prevention of greater harm (1999:128-
9).  Here she argues that while we consider it morally permissible to harm someone in order 
to prevent a greater harm befalling this individual—for example, when rescuers or surgeons 
must injure persons in order to rescue them from greater harms—we do not consider it 
similarly morally permissible to harm an unconsenting person in order to secure this 
individual a greater “pure benefit” (Shiffrin 1999:126-7).   
 
These kinds of benefits impart (non-essential) improvements—sensual pleasure, material 
enrichment, and the like—to our lives, and do not derive their “beneficial” status from the 
removal or prevention of harm (Shiffrin 1999:124-5).  As examples of pure benefits that we 
would deem it wrong to break an unconsenting patient’s arm for, Shiffrin lists “supernormal 
memory, a useful store of encyclopaedic knowledge, twenty IQ points worth of extra 
intellectual ability, or the ability to consume immoderate amounts of alcohol or fat without 
side effects” (1999:127). 
 
Shiffrin employs a parable to suggest that creation represents the bestowal of pure benefits 
(among other things), which appear impermissible to bestow (1999:127).  I summarise this 
parable below: 
 
Wealthy/Unlucky Case  
Wealthy is a very rich individual.  One day he decides to share some of his wealth 
with his neighbours, who live on a nearby island.  They are in no need of extra 
money.  Wealthy gets into his plane with a hundred cubes of gold bullion.  His 
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intention is to drop these gold cubes from the sky.  He goes about doing this, taking 
care not to hit anyone.  He is aware that his actions could maim, or even kill, but he 
has no other means of distributing his wealth.  Most of the recipients of gold cubes are 
surprised but happy to receive their unexpected gifts.  One person, Unlucky, does in 
fact get hit, and the impact breaks his arm.   
 
Wealthy might have delivered an all-things-considered benefit to Unlucky, but in doing so he 
placed Unlucky at great risk where no such risk previously existed, and indeed inflicted a 
serious injury upon Unlucky.  Similarly, even when parents create persons who come to view 
their lives to be all-things-considered beneficial, parents impose (the risk of) potentially 
serious harms upon their offspring:13 
 
Even if [Wealthy] took the greatest care, he imposed risk of harm and injury on 
another without consent and without the justification that it was necessary to avoid a 
more substantial harm.  Everyday procreation may be described in similar terms.  
(Shiffrin 1999:136) 
 
To my mind, Shiffrin is appealing to the following sort of principle: 
 
The Shiffrin-esque principle of permissible harm 
It is permissible for one to knowingly harm unconsenting patient A to a non-trivial degree if, 
and only if, the following conditions are met: a) one imposes the harm with the reasonable 
                                                 
13 DeGrazia (2012:153-4) makes an interesting distinction between imposing harm upon others, and merely 
exposing them to harm.  Procreation, he argues, does not usually impose harms upon children; rather, it merely 
exposes children to harm, along with the potential for great benefits.  Though I think that this impose-expose 
distinction is an important one deserving further discussion, for now I will simply point out that a lack of 
hypothetical consent is still a problem when aiming to argue that certain harmful acts are permissible—
regardless of whether the harm comes about through imposition or (simply) exposure. 
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expectation of thereby alleviating or saving patient A from a pre-existing or anticipated 
harm; and b) the imposed harm is a lesser harm than the harm one aims to alleviate.  
 
This principle is meant to capture the most prominent features of Shiffrin’s position regarding 
permissible harming.  On Shiffrin’s view, it is not (ordinarily) permissible to harm a patient 
in order to bestow a pure benefit upon this patient.  Therefore, I have not explicitly included 
the bestowal of pure benefits in the above principle.  Instead, I have included only features 
necessary and sufficient to justify harming an unconsenting patient, and there aren’t many 
such features, according to Shiffrin—with an important proviso (more on this below). 
 
Crucially, on the face of it, an anti-natal conclusion seems to follow from the above principle.  
Creating new persons exposes them to non-trivial harms.  While in other cases harming in 
this non-trivial fashion might be justified if it is in the service of saving persons from even 
greater harms, procreators cannot appeal to this possibility.  Procreation cannot sensibly be 
viewed as the act of saving non-existing persons from (greater) harm.  Rather, on Shiffrin’s 
account, procreation can be viewed, at best, as the morally problematic exposure to non-
trivial harms in order to offer uninvited and non-essential benefits (that is, “pure benefits”) to 
the person created; at worst, it can be viewed as the morally impermissible imposition of 
serious, protracted harms upon a patient that are not toward the alleviation of greater harms.  
Further, and most crucially, children do not have the opportunity to offer their consent to 
encounter the harms of existence in order to receive the benefits, which entails that it is 
wrong to procreate. 
 
Importantly, I label this principle “Shiffrin-esque” in no small part because it excludes an 
additional, pro-natal clause outlining an intention to offer compensation for the harms one 
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imposes.  Let me explain.  Shiffrin explicitly distances herself from the view that procreation 
is all-things-considered impermissible, claiming that it is consistent with her arguments to 
deem “nonconsensual, burden-imposing actions as morally problematic but not always 
impermissible”, or, further, to think of procreation as “a special case” (Shiffrin 1999:139).  
Shiffrin offers no reasons in support of the latter suggestion, so I set it aside.  She does 
however defend the notion of procreation as “morally problematic but not always 
impermissible”, arguing that 
  
the unconsented-to burdens of life do not make it wrong to procreate per se, but rather 
wrong to procreate without undertaking a commitment to share or alleviate any 
burdens the future child endures.  (Shiffrin 1999:139) 
 
And so, a revised Shiffrin-esque principle would incorporate an additional, Get Out of Anti-
Natal Jail for Free clause—something like the following: “c) one intends to offer, prior to 
imposing the burden, adequate compensation to patient A for this harm”. 
 
But here is why I doubt that this additional clause can do the heavy lifting Shiffrin 
presumably thinks it can, and why I exclude it from the principle above.  It seems to me that 
while it may often be good of me to offer compensation for harms I impose—perhaps it is in 
fact often morally required—it is doubtful that subsequent compensation could 
(retroactively?) render my initial act of harming permissible.  In other words, my subsequent 
actions, though they might reflect either positively or poorly on my character, do not render 
my original harmful act permissible or impermissible; they are silent on that issue.14 
                                                 
14 It is beyond the scope of my current project to examine the merits of appealing to subsequent compensation—
a task I take up in far greater detail in Singh (2012a). 
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The Shiffrin-esque principle implies, then, that it is impermissible for us to harm an 
unconsenting patient if we act solely to secure her benefits, but what if we believe that we can 
be reasonably sure that this patient would have consented to our actions?  What if, in other 
words, we believe that we are justified in presuming her hypothetical consent to our actions?  
This is an important question to consider in context of the natal debate, as it is not unlikely 
that most prospective parents would assume, if they thought about it at all, that their children 
would consent to being created, were they able to be asked and to respond. 
 
3. The hypothetical consent objection 
I will be looking at arguments for a certain kind of paternalism, as these arguments appear to 
rely on hypothetical consent in ways that might challenge Shiffrin’s strict views on 
permissible harming, and thus the anti-natal implications of her argument.  Indeed, I shall use 
paternalist and paternalism when referring to those who believe that certain harmful acts can 
be justified via appeals to hypothetical consent—such is the strength of the link I see between 
a defence of paternalism and an appeal to hypothetical consent.  On the face of it, some 
paternalistic acts appear to harm—often via autonomy-limiting interventions—for the sake of 
securing benefits.15  If this is so, and if we do indeed find such interventions permissible, it 
seems as though there is a larger category of permissible harms than Shiffrin believes.  The 
Shiffrin-esque principle of permissible harm is thus false—which, perhaps, leaves room for 
procreation to be considered permissible.  Indeed, procreation can be viewed as a 
paternalistic act, or at least an act performed with a paternalistic attitude: Parents decide to 
impose harms upon their children for the sake of securing those children benefits.  
                                                 
15 For example, parents often permissibly restrict the autonomy of their teenage children by forcing them to stay 
in and study.  The hope is that this will help give them a better chance at getting into a good college, and thereby 
secure them the additional benefits that come to gainfully employed adults with college degrees. 
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Hypothetical consent in the guise of paternalism thus presents an initially promising way of 
objecting to a Shiffrin-esque route to anti-natalism. 
 
In the following paragraphs, I examine an argument that appeals to hypothetical consent to 
justify the sort of paternalism I have discussed above.  I argue that paternalism need not in 
fact run afoul of the Shiffrin-esque principle of permissible harm: Shiffrin and the paternalist 
both appear to share similar intuitions regarding permissible harm.  I conclude that this 
strategy cannot successfully contest Shiffrin’s claim that appeals to hypothetical consent, 
while justified in cases where the aim is to avert greater harm, do not, upon reflection, seem 
justified where the aim is to bestow pure benefits.  Further, I argue that the degree of harm 
imposed is of utmost relevance when ascertaining the permissibility of paternalistic 
interventions, and it is not obviously the case that we are permitted to impose the serious 
harms of life. 
 
Before commencing upon a prima facie powerful critique of the Shiffrin-esque route to anti-
natalism using the notion of hypothetical consent, I think it will be necessary to define 
consent, and to show what makes hypothetical consent a special sort of consent.  I would like 
to suggest the following definition, which I borrow from A. John Simmons: Consenting is 
“the according to another by the consenter of a special right to act within areas within which 
only the consenter is normally free to act” (1979:77).  Consent is thus a sort of transactional 
relationship between two or more agents wherein one agent agrees to relinquish a degree of 
her autonomy to the other(s).  To draw an example from the political arena, elected 





Note that hypothetical consent is not equivalent to endorsement, nor is it the same as 
subsequent consent.  Consent always entails a sort of tacit agreement or contractual 
relationship between two or more individuals or institutions.  Endorsement is different, in that 
it is purely internal to the individual: Even if it is about another’s actions, it does not 
essentially involve a relationship with her.  An individual can consent to another’s actions—
think here, for example, of cases where “consent” is given under duress—but whether or not 
she endorses those actions is another matter. 
 
I now wish to distinguish between three varieties of consent: a) express consent, b) tacit 
consent, and c) hypothetical consent.  Express consent is when a consenter gives a “clear 
sign” of her consent to the one to whom she is consenting (Simmons 1979:64).16  Tacit 
consent is where a consenter does not give a clear sign of consent to a proposal, but where 
her consent can nevertheless be reasonably inferred from her lack of explicit objection to the 
proposal (Simmons 1979:80).17 
 
Hypothetical consent differs from the two varieties of consent discussed above, and requires a 
more extended discussion.  We are on occasion called to act on behalf of a person or persons 
who, for any number of reasons, are not available for consultation.  The opportunity to ask 
these persons for explicit signs of consent is thus not available to us, nor, by extension, is it 
plausible to infer their tacit consent.  On such occasions, we often must rely on some notion 
                                                 
16 For instance, a consenter could explicitly state that she is indeed giving her consent to another by performing 
some voluntary activity that both parties have agreed would clearly signify consent.  Examples of such 
voluntary activities include the showing of hands and the voicing of “ayes” or “nays”. 
17 To give an example—a modification of the one found in Simmons (1979:79-82)—a university lecturer could 
ask her students whether there are any objections to her extending her lecture by a few minutes, and, if no 




of hypothetical consent, asking ourselves what the persons we are acting on behalf of would 
consent to (if we were able to ask them, and they were able to answer us).   
 
Hypothetical consent can be separated into two sorts: Hypothetical consent that relies on 
objective criteria, and hypothetical consent that relies on subjective criteria.  In the former 
case, we can adopt a Rawlsian strategy and ask: To what sorts of proposals would contractors 
in the “original position” (Rawls 1971) be most reasonable to consent?18  Here we can say 
that, because they aim at promoting objective values and maximising universal goods, there 
are certain proposals to which everyone ought to consent.  Even if persons do not for some 
reason (currently or ever) care about these goods or values, we may be justified in asserting 
that they ought to care, and hence ought to consent to receiving them.   
 
A different strategy from the one just outlined is adopted in the case of hypothetical consent 
that relies on subjective criteria.  Here we ask: To what sorts of proposals would it be rational 
for agent A to consent, given her unique aims?  This second strategy is tailor-made to best 
reflect the interests and preferences of specific individuals.  So, for instance, let us assume 
that Wealthy somehow knows some of the people from his neighbouring island very well.  
He is thus so well acquainted with the unique interests and preferences of each of these 
people that he can say, with a very high degree of certainty, that they would probably consent 
to him placing them at significant risk in order to secure them the chance of acquiring gold 
bullion.  Were Wealthy to, under these altered circumstances, appeal to some notion of 
subjective hypothetical consent as (at least partial) justification for his decision to release 
gold bullion over his neighbouring island, it might reasonably make a difference to our 
                                                 
18 Note that though I employ him here to spell out the two types of hypothetical consent, Rawls himself is not a 
friend of the paternalists.  Also, see footnote 5. 
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assessment of the permissibility of his actions.  We might still consider his actions 
impermissible, though we might be inclined to think differently about the extent of his 
liability and the sort of compensation, if any, he owes the islanders. 
    
But procreators arguably cannot rely on subjective hypothetical consent when deciding on the 
permissibility of bringing people into existence.  Non-existers cannot be said to have 
preferences—let alone unique, individual preferences!  Shiffrin consistently maintains that 
the unique features of the individual being created cannot be taken into account by parents.  It 
therefore appears as though she thinks parents consider their unborn children generically—
which is to say, as things of the same sort.  But the pro-natal paternalist could argue that 
matters are not this simple.  He could say that, insofar as they can, parents often, and always 
ought to, consider the unique circumstances of the lives into which they will bring their 
children.  This line of reasoning appeals to the view that parents often have a pretty good idea 
of what kinds of lives their children can expect to enjoy.  Prospective parents can construct a 
relatively reliable picture of sorts from their shared genetic history, their socio-economic 
situation, etc., and can be reasonably sure regarding what their children would prefer.  On this 
line of reasoning, therefore, it is not quite accurate to say that prospective parents consider 
their potential offspring generically; rather, they consider their offspring, insofar as they can, 
as unique products of their (the parents’) unique circumstances.  
 
But I am not convinced that this objection holds much weight.  Consider the fact that siblings 
often have very different preferences.  Further, also consider that children very often fail to 
live up to their parents’ expectations.  Finally, though Shiffrin (so far as I can tell) thinks this 
is rare, children might not have a subjective preference for existence—and it may be begging 
the question against the anti-natalist to assert that children ought to have this as an objective 
 15 
 
preference.  (Consider here the problem of suicide.)19  And so, it does not look as though 
procreation can be justified via appeals to subjective hypothetical consent.  
 
What about appeals to hypothetical consent emphasising objective criteria, though?  On one 
reading, Shiffrin, the committed individualist, seems to underplay the possibility of 
determining objective values and universal goods that we all arguably ought to prefer.  
However, a closer reading of Shiffrin reveals both that there are indeed some objective goods 
for her, and that she allows for hypothetical consent to promote these goods (though it is not 
clear what she thinks these goods are).  When considering whether Wealthy was justified in 
relying on the hypothetical consent of the islanders when he decided to place them in harm’s 
way in order to benefit (some of) them, she is explicit that he was not.  This is not simply 
because Wealthy was not justified in relying on hypothetical consent, but rather because he 
was not justified in relying on hypothetical consent as someone acting to promote greater 
benefits and not avert greater harms.  In Shiffrin’s own words: 
 
[T]here seems to be a harm/benefit asymmetry built into our approaches to 
hypothetical consent where we lack specific information about the individual’s will.  
We presume (rebuttably) [the presence of hypothetical consent] in cases where greater 
harm is to be averted; in the cases of harms to bestow greater benefits, the 
presumption is reversed.  (Shiffrin 1999:131) 
 
                                                 
19 In the US in 2016, suicide was the second leading cause of death in age groups 10-14, 15-24, and 25-34, and 
the fourth leading cause of death in age groups 35-44 and 45-54 (CDC 2016).  Of course, I recognise that 
suicide is a phenomenon with many contributory factors, and I am cautious not to assume that there is a 
straightforward link between suicide and (thereby) “expressing a subjective preference not to exist”.  The 
statistics, though, are sobering, and whilst I am not sure how they should factor into the procreative 
deliberations of potential parents, I do think it would be unreasonable for parents to dismiss the problem of 
suicide without some level of existential engagement with it. 
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Unlike the rescuer, Wealthy acted not to remove patients from harm, but to secure them “pure 
benefits”.  What concerns Shiffrin most is that while a rescuer has good reasons to infer the 
hypothetical consent of the patient he is rescuing, Wealthy—and, by extension, all persons 
who place unconsenting patients in harm’s way in order to secure these patients pure 
benefits—had no good reason to think that he had some way of ascertaining what sorts of 
harms the islanders would willingly expose themselves to: “I do not think it is clear that 
Unlucky would give his consent nor is it clear what test is relevant: that his consent is 
certain? rationally required? likely?” (Shiffrin 1999:132; my emphasis).  In contrast, with 
the rescue case Shiffrin concedes that appeals to hypothetical consent might be “appropriate”, 
as “something of great objective significance is at stake” (Shiffrin 1999:132; my emphasis). 
 
It appears to me that a case can be made for the claim that the rescuer is appealing to 
hypothetical consent to bestow benefits as well as avert harms.  Though the evaluation of 
harms and benefits is, Shiffrin consistently maintains, an individual, subjective matter, in the 
rescue case she can be read as allowing for (in the promotion of some good—which I shall 
tentatively refer to as survival20) an appeal to objective criteria.  And so, though Shiffrin does 
indeed consistently place great emphasis on respecting individual liberty—and thus 
subjective preferences and interests over some notion of objective, universal preferences and 
interests—she does not appear to be blind to the existence of objective goods we all ought to 
consent to receive (even if this entails some harm to ourselves).  I now wish to test whether 
there is indeed a longer list of objective goods than she is willing to acknowledge.  
Consider the following principle, which, to my mind, encapsulates the paternalist’s ethical 
stance regarding the permissibility of harmful intervention: 
 
                                                 
20 Or perhaps a larger set of objective goods, as survival usually encompasses other goods. 
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The paternalistic principle of permissible harm  
It is permissible for one to knowingly harm unconsenting patient A to a non-trivial degree if 
one has good reasons for assuming her objective hypothetical consent to one’s action.  
 
It seems to me that though we can agree with Shiffrin that harming for the sake of bestowing 
pure benefits is morally problematic, this need not be the end of the story.  We could for 
instance deny that our lack of any “specific information about the individual’s will” (Shiffrin 
1999:131) is fatal to the permissibility of our interference(s) on behalf of the individual 
concerned.  We could claim that there is indeed a longer list of objective goods we can refer 
to in order to help us decide whether our interventions are permissible.  Hence, while we 
might not have enough information about a given individual to rely on subjective criteria 
when assessing the permissibility of hypothetical consent—or we might be Rawlsians, 
asserting that subjective criteria are not morally significant, even when available—we may 
still have sufficient justification to interfere on her behalf according to certain objective 
criteria, such as the promotion of goods like health, compulsory education for children, and, 
indeed, liberty.  I am interested as to whether procreation can be justified via an appeal to 
objective hypothetical consent.   
 
In order to further challenge Shiffrin here, I suggest that we consider some arguments for 
paternalism that appeal to hypothetical consent.  Friends of paternalism hold that it is often 
permissible to harm individuals—by limiting their autonomy, for instance—in order to 
advance one or more of their interests.  To be clear, the paternalist could agree with Shiffrin 
that every individual’s capacity for autonomous decision-making, as it relates to their own 
lives, ought to be respected.  But the paternalist could also point out that individuals are often 
not in the best position to recognise what is in their best interests.  Indeed, individuals often 
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have conflicting interests.  For instance, I might have a very firm desire to live a long, healthy 
life.  I might also have an unhealthy desire to smoke, which, despite various attempts, I 
cannot quite break away from.  This latter interest is in conflict with my former, deeper, more 
consistent desire for longevity.  To restate the preceding from the perspective of a paternalist 
appealing to some notion of subjective hypothetical consent: my subjective preference, 
overall, is to stop smoking.  Another person assisting me in expressing this preference to stop 
smoking will be working to bestow a benefit upon me.   
 
But, to alter the example so as to apply it to the alternative principle of permissible 
harming—which appeals to objective hypothetical consent—what if I do not ever desire to 
stop smoking?  In other words, what if I have conflicting preferences, and/or, despite the 
serious health risks, what if giving up smoking is in fact not one of my preferences 
(subjective or otherwise)?  Perhaps, through wishful thinking, I have convinced myself that 
smoking’s well-documented adverse effects will not affect me, and that I will not impede my 
goal of living a long and healthy life if I continue to smoke indefinitely.  And perhaps no 
amount of information to the contrary will get me to change my mind.  Another person 
interfering in my wish to continue smoking is not assisting me in expressing my deeper 
preference, as I see it.  It is instructive to look at my situation here from the perspective of 
someone appealing to some notion of objective hypothetical consent.  From such a 
perspective, it could be said that an activity such as smoking hinders one’s capacity for 
autonomous decision-making to the point that one falls under its spell, becoming a slave to it 
(Goodin 1989). 
 
I would like to highlight a couple of conclusions that I think follow from this analogy to 
enslavement.  First, as no one can be said to rationally give oneself into slavery, it can be 
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assumed that no one would rationally decide to fall under the spell of a severely autonomy-
limiting state such as addiction (Goodin 1989:586; Mill 1974:173).  Thus, secondly, the 
preferences of one currently under its spell to remain there ought not to be respected.  To 
clarify, a paternalistic perspective appealing to some notion of objective hypothetical consent 
might assert that certain activities are, objectively speaking, irrational to adopt: We are 
justified in assuming, says the paternalist, that no self-interested rational agents would deem 
it reasonable to promote such activities.   
 
This is especially true, as mentioned, for autonomy-diminishing activities from which one 
cannot escape.  With such activities, the paternalist wishing to appeal to some notion of 
objective hypothetical consent might assert that because not engaging in such activities ought 
to be everyone’s firm preference, there ought to be little objection to paternalistic measures 
being adopted that ensure such activities become more difficult to start or continue to engage 
in.  To put this another way, there are apparently certain benefits all persons ought to want to 
receive: The smoker, for example, ought to desire the good of health, and we are justified in 
promoting this good (that is, “benefiting” him) even if it involves curtailing his freedom (that 
is, “harming” him) by restricting his access to cigarettes. 
 
4. Replies to the initial hypothetical consent objection 
To summarise, it appears as though there are indeed cases where it is fairly uncontroversial to 
harm unconsenting persons in order to benefit them, cases where we are justified in assuming 
the hypothetical consent of these persons.  Does this mean that the Shiffrin-esque principle of 
permissible harm is false—a principle which, recall, permits (non-trivial) harm only in order 




I first point out (in 4.1.) that in the most prominent instances of where hypothetical consent is 
permissibly presumed—namely, the most tenable cases of paternalistic intervention—the aim 
is to prevent serious harms.  Procreation is not toward this end.  Second, I proffer (in 4.2.) a 
plausible counter on behalf of the paternalist.  I then argue that this counter fails to challenge 
my response on behalf of Shiffrin, in that it would only look plausible if trivial harms were 
imposed.  Procreation, I argue, is significantly removed from this case (as well as from 
paternalism), and therefore does not appear a plausible candidate for justification via an 
appeal to hypothetical consent.   
 
4.1. Hypothetical consent works only when significant harm is at stake                                                   
According to the preceding formulation of paternalism, interfering with a patient’s autonomy 
is sometimes permissible if it furthers some objective good, such as her health.  To be clear, 
the paternalist would justify this intervention by appealing to objective hypothetical consent: 
He would say that harming in order to secure a patient certain objective goods—health, 
education, liberty, etc.—is (often) permissible, because the patient being acted upon would 
consent to such harmful actions were she of course available to give her consent, and were 
she considering matters in light of objective reasons. 
 
But all the paternalistic interventions I have mentioned so far, though they aim to confer 
benefits, do so by removing or preventing harm; in other words, they are not in aid of 
conferring pure benefits.  “Pure benefits”, remember, do not involve the removal or 
prevention of harm.  However—and this is crucial—in every example of clearly permissible 
paternalistic intervention I have mentioned (and can think of), an appeal to objective 
hypothetical consent looks justified because the removal or prevention of harm is involved.  
Paternalistic interventions promote the objective good of education, and neglecting one’s 
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education can be immeasurably harmful (especially to one born into significant socio-
economic disadvantages); anti-smoking measures promote the objective good of health, and 
sickness is the opposite of health; and so on.  Paternalistic interventions making it harder for 
smokers to procure cigarettes (through the imposition of so-called “sin taxes”) or consume 
them (by making explicit the effects of smoking via labels on cigarette cartons) gain their 
justification due to the fulfilment of conditions (a) and (b) in the Shiffrin-esque principle.  
Paternalistic interventions of the sort most plausibly justified by objective hypothetical 
consent thus do not appear to run afoul of this principle.   
 
And so, whether the paternalist is arguing for intervention toward the end of health, education 
or liberty, “something of great objective significance is at stake” (Shiffrin 1999:132)—
namely the removal or prevention of greater harm—and people, all things being equal, ought 
to consent to such interventions.  I therefore do not see why Shiffrin would need to object to 
paternalism as such; she can concede much to the paternalist and still be consistent with the 
principle of permissible harm I have attributed to her.  However, in my view, Shiffrin has 
much to say regarding when paternalistic interventions are permissible, or—to be more 
precise—when appeals to hypothetical consent are justified.  To summarise, what I might 
claim at this point, on behalf of Shiffrin, is that hypothetical consent appears to justify harm 
only to alleviate or prevent greater harm. 
 
In assessing Shiffrin’s argument, Rivka Weinberg (2016) argues that paternalism is justified 
in the case of procreation, because children do not have consent rights (Weinberg 2016:137).  
I think Weinberg underemphasises a vital component of Shiffrin’s argument, namely the 
claim that when we impose serious harms upon a patient, we need adequate justification to 
do so.  In other words, notwithstanding the consent status of the patient, the degree of harm 
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we impose upon them (or expose them to) matters, as does the justification for its imposition.  
In the next section, I further explore these thoughts. 
 
4.2. The degree of imposed harm matters 
It is possible for the paternalist to counter my response in the following manner.  It is possible 
for him to claim that certain goods exert such a powerful appeal that only the most 
unreasonable persons would object to receiving them, regardless of the degree of harm 
involved.  But I will demonstrate how this claim, too, can be defeated. 
 
Consider the following example of a pure benefit, one which is arguably an objective good, 
and which could perhaps be viewed as a good we all ought to want to receive—even if we 
need to be harmed in order to receive it.  The good I have in mind is an utterly wonderful 
aesthetic experience.  I will use the example of a gorgeous, unforgettable sunset.  Imagine the 
following scenario, in which a paternalistic act is performed exclusively toward the 




You are part of a tourist group on a train travelling through a rainforest.  As with 
everyone else in your tour group, you have fallen into a deep, dreamless sleep.  The 
tour leader is awake, however, and, looking out the train windows, he sees a most 
beautiful scene.  [Long, poetic description of the sun setting through treetops.]  Now, 
this is quite a large tour group, and the sun is just about to disappear beneath the 
horizon; your tour leader does not have enough time to race through the train to wake 
everyone up.  It just so happens that every seat and bunk in this train is electrified: 
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with the push of a button, a mild electric current will be sent through every seated and 
lying passenger on the train, waking anyone who happens to be asleep.  Your tour 
leader has this button on his remote keychain; he presses it.  You and everyone else in 
your tour group are awoken with a start.  You are all greeted by the last few moments 
of a most memorable picture as the train’s carriages are lit by the soft orange glow of 
a glorious sunset. 
 
In the above case, the tour leader harmfully intervenes in order to procure others a pure 
benefit.  Do his actions look justified?  There is nothing inherently harmful to not seeing a 
sunset.  Missing out on such an experience, especially if one alone has missed out, can make 
one feel very disappointed.  And one is arguably wronged when another seeks to disappoint 
one by denying one a nonessential but desirable experience or good.  But that sunset is 
breathtaking!  It could be held that the tour group members would surely be acting 
unreasonably—ungrateful, even—if they (after soaking up the scene, perhaps) confronted 
their tour leader over his (they might allege) ill-treatment of them.   
 
But note that the Sunset case states that a “mild electric current” will be sent through every 
passenger.  Suppose that mild electric shocks count as trivial harms, all things considered.  
What difference would it make, morally, if the voltage were increased to a level where it was 
a matter of reasonable dispute whether electric shocks of such an intensity counted as trivial 
or not?  Further, what difference would it make to one’s evaluation of the tour leader’s 
actions if his interventions were such that they imposed lasting, ongoing effects?  For 
example, if he risked burning and scarring some or all of the passengers, I doubt that his 
actions would meet with universal approval from the tour group.  I doubt, in other words, 
whether the tour leader could reasonably assume the objective hypothetical consent of all 
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those he acted on behalf of.  Procreators, to my mind, take a similar gamble when they opt to 
“awaken” individuals to the (pure) benefits of life. 
   
I propose that, despite its status as an objective good, the degree of harm required to secure 
this benefit (in Sunset) is indeed, as Shiffrin believes, of utmost moral relevance.  There 
ought to be, in other words, limits to the degree of harm we are willing to impose for the sake 
of conferring such goods.  The Sunset case works only if the imposed harm remains trivial, 
and is thus, as I will motivate, relevantly unlike procreation.  For I am doubtful as to how 
analogous this and other pure benefits are with the “real thing”—procreation. 
 
The decision whether or not to procreate is far more complicated than weighing up, on the 
one hand, the imposition of harms as trivial and transitory as pinpricks or mild electric shocks 
against, on the other, objective goods (whatever they may be).  The harms procreation 
imposes are serious, protracted and inescapable (without great cost).  New existers are 
greeted by all kinds of distressing stimuli, are immediately set upon by a mass of infectious 
organisms, and would quickly perish without close and attentive care.  If they survive 
infancy, there are still all manner of hazards they must navigate with the help of caregivers.  
In the US in 2016, unintentional injury was the leading cause of death in age groups 1-4 
through 35-44 (CDC 2016).21  Illnesses—from minor infections to terminal cancers—leave 
no one untouched.  Natural disasters, too, can have devastating impacts, as can heartbreak.  
And finally, by “inescapable (without great cost)” above, I mean that there is no way to 
escape the harms of life without succumbing to, or imposing upon oneself via suicide, the 
harm of death.22  
                                                 
21 This statistic covers the following age groups: 1-4, 5-9, 10-14, 15-24, 25-34, and 35-44. 
22 Not everyone would agree that death should appear in this list; Epicureans would deny that death is bad for 
the one who dies.  For a recent (and forceful) argument against the Epicurean view, see Benatar (2017:92-141).   
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For the tour leader’s actions to be more like those of procreators’, he would have to recreate 
each passenger’s life anew.  For being born is not like awaking from a deep sleep to continue 
on a pre-existing journey; being created is starting experience from scratch.  And thus, for his 
actions to be more analogous with those of procreators, the tour leader would have to reset, as 
it were, the psychological narratives of his passengers.  Further, he would have to run the risk 
of permanently maiming or imposing disabilities of varying degrees upon his passengers. 
 
To be fair to the paternalist (and to myself!), I acknowledge that conceiving suitable 
analogies to procreation is very difficult, as procreation is weird: It is an activity that involves 
the creation of a brand new moral agent seemingly out of the ether.  Arguably, no other 
human activity comes anywhere close to replicating the strange, wondrous magic that is 
bringing-into-being.  Thus, I do not claim to have captured all the morally relevant features of 
procreation (for this would be a nearly impossible task), only those that I think are most 
relevant to assessing the claim that harming in order to offer the pure benefits of existence 
can be justified by appealing to objective hypothetical consent.23 
   
And so, though the paternalist may well appeal to the objective attractiveness of certain 
goods, he cannot reasonably deny the moral relevance of the degree of harm required to 
bestow these benefits.  The moral issue of procreating to “benefit” children really is more 
complex than this, and we thus ought to reject the argument from hypothetical consent.24 
 
                                                 
23 To be clear, I think that certain pure benefits (Sunset is meant to describe a pure benefit) can be justified even 
if the condition outlined in 4.1 (significant harm must be at stake) is not satisfied, as long as the harms imposed 
are not too serious (that is, as long as 4.2 obtains).  In fact, I believe that if the harms of a typical life were 
sufficiently trivial, then, arguably, even many anti-natalists would agree that procreation would be permissible.  
But, of course, no lives are so blessed as to contain only trivial harms. 
24 Note that a loss of some degree of autonomy is usually the extent to which patients are injured by paternalistic 




In defending a Shiffrin-esque route to anti-natalism, I have argued that appeals to 
hypothetical consent only appear to be justified in cases where the aim is to avert serious 
harm—namely in some acts of paternalism.  Procreation is not such a case.  Further, I have 
argued against the notion that there are certain objective goods everyone would 
(hypothetically) consent to receiving even if they needed to be non-trivially harmed in order 
to receive these goods.  Here, I defended the claim that the degree of harm required to grant 
individuals (access to) these (alleged) objective goods is of utmost moral relevance.  The 
paternalist—and the defender of procreation in general—has some work to do in order to 
justify the imposition of harms as serious as those experienced in a typical life.  But though I 
think that the arguments advanced by Benatar and Shiffrin help illustrate that procreation is 
indeed deeply morally problematic, and that more sophisticated defences of procreation are 
required than mere appeals to hypothetical consent, I am also of the view that the debate is far 
from settled in favour of anti-natalism.   
 
My arguments here have remained within the welfarist moral framework favoured by anti-
natalists and a large majority of moral philosophers in the analytic tradition.  According to 
this framework, considerations of welfare ought to be the primary focus of our moral 
judgements.25  But an ethics focussed on a non-welfarist good, such as dignity, might be 
more favourable to procreation.  This potential route to a pro-natal conclusion has been 
suggested in the literature—to some degree by David Spurrett (2011:203) and, more 
explicitly, by Thaddeus Metz (2012:8-9)—but has yet to be thoroughly explored.  I propose 
                                                 
25 Though Shiffrin does focus on consent, what ultimately weighs against procreation is the fact that non-trivial 
harms are also involved. 
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that going beyond welfarism in this manner might also illuminate discussions outside of anti-
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